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IMPLEMENTATION AND MODIFICATION OF TITLE
IX STANDARDS:
THE EVOLUTION OF ATHLETICS POLICY

Robert R. Hunt*
I. INTRODUCTION

The protracted litigation in Cohen v. Brown University, 1 in
which a series of federal courts construed the requirements of
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 19722 in the context
of athletic programming, culminated in a major victory for
women athletes and, conversely has given colleges and universities greater reason to reflect upon their efforts to secure an
NCAA championship. In Cohen, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit described equal opportunity for men and
women to participate as the "core of Title IX's purpose" and
applied a three-part test to ascertain the university's progress
towards that goal. 3 The case concluded with the court's condemnation of Brown's efforts (though the University was years
ahead of its peers in providing opportunities for female studentathletes) and the Supreme Court's refusal to hear Brown's the
University's appeal. Currently therefore, colleges and universities are faced with the judicial endorsement of Title IX policy
which arguably requires institutions to take the steps

* Mr. Hunt received his J.D. and his Ph.D. in Higher Education
Administration from the University of Utah. This paper is an extract of his doctoral
dissertation entitled Implementation and the Expansion of the Mandate: A History
and Critical Legal Analysis of Twenty-five Years of Title IX Athletic Policy
Development (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah) (on file with
author).
1. The litigation generated four independent rulings: Cohen v. Brown Univ.
(Cohen [), 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd (Cohen In 991 F.2d 888 (1'' Cir.
1993), aff'd on remand, (Cohen lin 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd (Cohen /V)
101 F.3d. 155 (1" Cir. 1996) and cert. denied 117 S. Ct 1469 (1997).
2. Title IX provides that: "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681-1688.
3. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 897.
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necessary to provide athletic opportunities to men and women
on a proportionately equal basis.
This depiction is premised on the observation that the
three-part analysis applied in Cohen, or the "effective accommodation" analysis, 4 can only be satisfied by achieving the statistical relationship between participation and enrollment known as
"substantial proportionality" which Cohen and other courts
have acknowledged as a "safe harbor" from legal challenge. 5 In
application, this means that to avoid the imposition of a presumption of noncompliance, institutions are obliged to extend
greater opportunities to women via preferential program
expansion-notwithstanding conflicts with the underlying statute and equal protection doctrine. 6 It is on this basis that the
requirements have been characterized in some corners as "an
affirmative action, quota-based scheme." 7
Title IX and its legislative history8 explicitly discourage the
use of preferences. Section 1681(b) ofthe statute, in particular,
provides that:
Nothing contained in ... this section shall be interpreted to
require any educational institution to grant preferential or
disparate treatment to members of one sex on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving
the benefits of any federally supported program or activity in
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
that sex in any community, state, section or other area. 9

4. The analysis, first outlined by the Department of Education's Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) in its 1979 "Policy Interpretation" allows institutions to demonstrate
compliance in one of three ways: 1) substantial proportionality between the ratio of
men and women in the athletics program and the ratio of male to female
undergraduates; 2) by demonstrating a history and continuing practice of program
expansion for the underrepresented sex; or 3) by demonstrating that the existing
program "fully and effectively" accommodates the interests and abilities of the
underrepresented sex. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979).
5. See id.
6. See William E. Thro & Brian A. Snow, The Conflict Between the Equal
Protection Clause and Cohen v. Brown University, 123 EDUC. L. REP. 1013, 1016
(1998) (arguing that the great victory for women in Cohen was achieved by sacrificing
the constitutional value that no one should be treated differently on the basis of
gender).
7. Cohen N, 101 F.3d 155 (1' 1 Cir. 1996) (Torruella, J., dissenting).
8. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ. of the Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 941h Cong. (1975).
9. 20 U.S.C. §1681(b) (1998).
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By affirming the use of preferences to address statistical disparities in athletic participation that may reflect genuine differences in athletic interests rather than discrimination, in short,
Cohen can be viewed as an endorsement of a much broader view
of Title IX than the statute, or its history may warrant.
The foregoing characterization of Cohen, of course, involves
many complex issues which are not only difficult to summarize,
but challenge traditional distinctions between matters of law
and public policy. From a public policy perspective, moreover,
Cohen is in many respects a reasonable extension of Title IX's
underlying purpose of ending sex discrimination in education
and an appropriate (and perhaps overdue) response to the defiance of colleges and universities toward the regulation. Legally
speaking, on the other hand, the decision can be interpreted as
greater than the sum of Title IX's legislatively authorized parts.
The objective of this Article is to examine Cohen as an evolution of Title IX standards with the hope of better understanding both the Title IX experience and the effect of that unique,
post-legislative process known as "implementation" on the development of law and policy. Part II of this Article sets forth the
conceptual framework which will guide this examination. Part
III recounts the legal and political climate leading up to the
adoption of Title IX. Part IV describes the modification of standards over the 25 years since the statute's enactment. Part V
discusses the prevailing views of the current regulatory framework. Finally, Part VI concludes that colleges and universities
face a much more invasive type of regulation than anticipated
at the time of the statute's creation.

II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The conceptual framework chosen for this Article focuses on
the delicate process of implementing governmental mandates
like Title IX, which essentially use the legal system to advance
substantive social objectives. It is attentive, in particular, to the
pressures brought to bear on the legal system when confronted
with politically charged social initiatives and when asked to
resolve disputes involving significant issues of public policy.
As a topic of social-scientific research, implementation has
received considerable attention of late. Beginning with Press-
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man and Wildavsky's seminal study, 10 social scientists have
examined a host ofvariables theorized to influence implementation outcomes including resource, organizational, and political
requirements.
From these studies some agreement has arisen that the
process simply involves too many variables to persist in the
belief that lawmakers can unilaterally create policies which
address all the relevant social, organizational, and political
needs. 11 "The day is long gone," as Yudof observed, "when lawyers and social scientists [could] assume that Court decisions
and legislative and administrative rules automatically are
translated into the desired action." 12
While explanations of this breakdown between command
and compliance abound, comparatively little has been said
about the role of law and the legal system in the implementation equation. An exception is William Clune, who in the early
1980s recognized implementation as a process of creating or
attempting social change through law and widely ruminated on
the consequences of the use of law for "social engineering." 13 In
a system traditionally characterized by the rigorous observation
of predetermined legal standards, Clune is interested in what
occurs when that conventional legal "rationality" collides with
politically-charged social reform like Title IX.
Clune discusses two related effects at length. The first is the
inability of conventional legal rationality to adequately comprehend or resolve what are essentially public policy conflicts. The
second involves the infusion of public policy discourse into the
interpretation and enforcement of rights that which, unlike

10. JEFFERY PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT
EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND, (1st ed., 1973).
11. See MALCOLM GoGGIN, IMPLEMENTATION THEORY AND PRACTICE: TOWARD A
THIRD GENERATION (1990).
12. Mark Yudof, Implementation Theories and Desegregation Realities, 2 ALA. L.
441, 443 (1981). He adds: "[t]he conflict between discretion and compliance with
policies embodied in rules has been long recognized in the law. There are many
similarities between jurisprudence and implementation theory as each seeks to
unravel the complex relationship between coercive policies and rules and relatively
autonomous decision making." !d. at 446.
13. William H. Clune, III, A Political Model of Implementation and Implications
of the Model for Public Policy, Research, and the Changing Roles of Law and
Lawyers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 47, 51 (1983).
REV.
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those in the private sector, "depend dramatically on the state
rather than freedom from the state." 14
The legal system, Clune avers, is primarily responsible for
the maintenance of the modern regulatory-welfare-state, an
area in which issues oflaw and public policy are often inextricable. This responsibility, he argues, has precipitated a shift from
the rigid "rule-orientation" of conventional legal rationality to a
"reflexive rationality" which is more responsive to social and
political input. 15 For the sake of social progress, in other words,
Courts and bureaucrats, are more readily engaged in activities
ordinarily regarded as the exclusive domain of the legislative
bodies, such as evaluating competing social interests and the
effects of policy. 16
This "politicization" of public law, Clune argues, stems from
the shortcomings of the political process itself. To negotiate
that process, for instance, lawmakers must often resort to statutory language which evades difficult, embedded issues. Compounding this imprecision is the fact that whatever knowledge
is available to legislators about the social problem they wish to
address is typically deficient. The result is the generation of
"socio-legal" mandates that are momentarily satisfactory to a
group of politicians, yet fail to adequately comprehend either
the problem or the effects of policy on the problem.
Moreover, because common implementation chores like the
interpretation, application, and enforcement of these directives
provide a multitude of opportunities for interested parties to
alter the enacted "political balance" (or the way in which competing demands were originally compromised by legislators),
efforts will inevitably be mounted to either restrict or expand
the law's sphere of influence. Arguments that some aspect of
the program imposes an unreasonable hardship or fails to adequately advance the goals of the statute, for example, may materialize in the form of a lawsuit seeking to annul regulations
and guidelines.

14. ld. at 102-03.
15. See id.; see also Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in
Modern Law, 17 L. & Soc'Y REV. 239 (1983).
16. See Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law,
17 L. & Soc'y REV. 239 (1983);-see also Harold A. McDougall, Social Movements, Law,
and Implementation: A Clinical Dimension for the New Legal Process, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 83 (1989).
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Because such activities tend to elicit similar actions from
those with conflicting interests and ideologies. Clune describes
implementation as an "interactive" process in which "[a]ny
given legal or political action may be met with a reaction by the
organizations affected." 17
Thus, a bill or a judicial decree introduced to enforce civil
rights may be met with legislative initiatives designed to dilute or reinforce it. Regulations enacted under legislation may
be met with political resistance and the regulations may be
revoked. Enforcement measures such as threatened sanctions
may be greeted with political backlash designed to produce a
withdrawal of the threat, or with various organizational adaptations. . . . In a lawsuit, these efforts take the form of
attempts to modify the decree or to obtain various remedial
orders. In administrative practice, lobbying to strengthen or to
weaken the underlying statute, administrative regulations,
and practical administrative sanctions are common. 18
Within a process bearing a resemblance to a military campaign,
in other words, competing demands are constantly reasserted
in the hope that objectives and standards will be modified.
"When policy does grow in an orderly fashion," Clune asserts,
"it is because struggles were resolved at a multitude of critical
junctures in a manner at least reasonably consistent with the
underlying purpose of the law." 19
At the heart of Clune's "political model of implementation,"
therefore, is the proposition that political struggles over policy
goals do not necessarily expire with the legislative process, but
are exported to the implementation process where discretion is
considerably decentralized and can be set in motion by interested parties on either side of the issues. This accessibility, he
asserts, operates as a virtual assurance that organizations will
confront one another in "legalized sectors of public policy," and
that the progression from a statutory directive to the legal detail of a functioning, regulatory framework will rarely be logical
or tranquil. 20 Struggle, conflict, and compromise among contending interest groups, in short, will ensure that policy goals

17. Clune, supra note 13, at 56.
18. Id. at 56-57.
19. ld. at 57-58.
20. See id. at 99.
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and their associated costs are continuously revisited, accompanied by the potential that the political balance of the program
may be revised.
Clune's assertions about the nature of implementation and
public law, to summarize, stand in marked contrast to more
conventional theories holding that implementation is (or should
be) merely a ministerial process in which political determinations of policy are faithfully carried out, 21 as well as legal theory
holding that the law and the legal system are (or should be)
insulated from social and political influence. 22 While acknowledging that these conventional suppositions have some validity,
Clune believes that the real and perceived effect of substantive
social reforms on a host of interests makes implementation an
inescapably political undertaking.
In addition to supplying a conceptual framework for understanding implementation, Clune provides a great deal of practical guidance for those interested in examining the modification
of legal objectives in implementation. Because the mandate is
viewed as an "overture to a complex process of compromise and
adjustment," in particular, he believes that an understanding of
that political compromise, is the basis for comprehending later
modifications, which are held to "proceed from the same
source." 23 The balance of this Article focuses on the history and
structure of Title IX, information which, is in turn, is used to
examine several significant adjustments in the program's gen-

21. See Daniel A Mazmanian & Paul A. Sabatier, The Conditions of Effective
Implementation: A Guide to Accomplishing Policy Objectives, 5 POL'Y ANALYSIS 481
(1979); GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY (1980).
22. See Isaac D. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the
"Relative Autonomy" of the Law, 11 L. & Soc'y REV. 571 (1977). The distinction
between traditional legal rationality and the "modern-public" rationality to which
Clune ascribes lies in differing conceptions of the appropriate relationship of legal
norms to society, and the conceptual apparatus used to sustain that relationship.
Under traditional views, law is held to be authoritative because its norms, or moral
and technical determinations, are insulated from social and political manipulation
through the observation "rational formalities," including the strict application of
posited legal rules and principles.
This "autonomy" from politics, however, is criticized as the sources of the law's
inability to respond to the evolution of social values. Relying on a body of legal
professionals who employ "peculiarly legal reasoning to resolve specific conflicts,"
according to Clune and others, inhibits the flexibility and learning necessary to
successfully administer socio-legal programs. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and
Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & Soc'y REV. 239 (1983).
23. Clune, supra note 13, at 59, 83.
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eral objectives as well as those which have occurred in the
much narrower context of the regulation of intercollegiate athletics.

III.

TITLE

IX FORMATION

The overarching aim of the women's groups, which, in the
early 1970s coalesced into the "second women's movement," was
to exploit the "full range of political tactics" to combat the use of
gender classifications in laws and policies governing many aspects of social and economic life. 24 Lawsuits, for example, were
initiated to pressure the federal courts to elevate the level of
scrutiny applied to gender classification under equal protection
analysis, 25 and a major political campaign was mounted to secure approval of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA? 6-a constitutional measure designed to prohibit the use of gender classifications in all but the most compelling circumstances. The
legislative effort from which Title IX emerged, in other words,
was but one aspect of a three-part strategy to produce a basis in
the law for a "single, coherent theory of women's equality," and
the sole component of that strategy which sought to take capitalize on the recent successes of the civil rights movement. 27
As a contemporary and harmonious political objective,
therefore, the ERA provides perhaps the clearest expression of
the goals which prompted Representative Edith Green to introduce an amendment in 1970 to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
(1964) designed to prohibit sex discrimination in all federally

24. See ALBIE SACHS, & JOAN HOFF WILSON, A STUDY OF MALE BELIEFS AND
LEGAL BIAS IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATE (1978); see also W. Douglas Gostain,
& Anne N. Gostain, The Political Strategies of Social Movements: A Comparison of
the Women's and Environmental Movements, 19 GONG. & THE PRESIDENCY 1 (1992).
25. At the time, laws and policies differentiating between men and women, or
"gender classifications" were sustained under equal protection analysis if they bore
a reasonable relationship to some legitimate governmental objective. By contrast, laws
and policies creating racial classifications had to be narrowly tailored to affect some
compelling government interest.
26. The Equal Rights Amendment provided that: "equality of right under the
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account
of sex." H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Gong. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Gong. (1971).
27. Barbara A. Brown, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for
the Equal Rights of Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
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assisted programs. Like the ERA, the proposed Title VI amendment was opposed on the basis that it would engender an undesirable level of equality between the sexes because in many
aspects of social and economic life sex, it was widely regarded
as a bona fide basis for differential treatment. 28 Green responded in 1971 by introducing an independent provision limited to prohibiting sex discrimination in federally assisted educational programs and activities, with express exemptions for
single-sex, military, and religious institutions. 29
In slightly altered form, this provision proved to be the sole
success of the three-part strategy to effect change in federal law
by members of the women's movement. But this success only
distantly reflected the goal exhibited in the ERA of eradicating
sex discrimination on the broadest possible scale. On one level,
therefore, the movement's inability to emulate that policy (as
well as the judiciary's continued resistance to elevating equal
protection standards and the ultimate failure of ERA) can be
understood as the result of an unwillingness on the part of lawmakers to treat sex discrimination like race discrimination.
Nowhere was this unwillingness more apparent than in the
effort to further qualify Title IX protection by exempting college
and university admissions policies from the operation of the
proposed legislation. In that instance, Republican lawmakers in
the House of Representatives asserted that the imposition of
federal control over admissions would "plant the seed of destruction for our system of higher education as we know it." 30
Enactment of Title [IX] would ... significantly weaken one of
the great strengths of the American system of higher education-diversity. Diversity in the types of educational institutions affords more freedom to students, allowing each the
opportunity to select the type of educational environment best
suited to their individual needs, and encourages colleges to
experiment and develop innovative programs. The imposition
of a monolithic unity by federal statute would serve only to

28. Minority groups already covered by Title VI were wary that banning sex
discrimination under Title VI would create a political backlash threatening the source
of their own protection. See Hearings before the Special Subcomm. on Educ. of the
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong., vols. 1 & 2 (1970) ("1970 House Hearing
Report").
29. See id.
30. 117 CONG. REC. 39,249 (1971).
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homogenize campuses, a condition repugnant to the very na-

ture of higher education in this country and contrary to the
best interests of the future generations of college students. 31
Although the proposed legislation sought only to eliminate the
consideration of an applicant's sex rather than require institutions to equalize numbers of male and female students, the
rhetoric was enlarged to illustrate the potential erosion of institutional autonomy and academic freedom:
Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment to preserve the swiftly
eroding rights of colleges and universities of America. We
must view Title [IX] for what it plainly is, just one more giant
step toward involvement by the Federal Government in the
internal affairs of institutions of higher education. The constant danger is that all too often federal involvement in the
internal affairs of institutions is but the first step toward ultimate Federal control. 32
Without the prompting of a change in constitutional law elevating gender to the same level of protection as race (e.g. ratification of the ERA), Title IX opponents may have reasoned, there
was little reason to abandon the longstanding tradition of deference to college and university discretion or to marginalize the
academic freedoms acknowledged by the Supreme Court in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire to include the "ability of the institution to determine for itself, on academic grounds . . . who may
be admitted." 33
To such assertions, Title IX proponents responded that federal intervention in higher education for the purpose of preventing discrimination was not an issue of first impression;
Congress had enacted Title VI of the Civil Rights Act nearly a
decade earlier to prohibit colleges and universities from discriminating on the basis of race or nationality. 34 Ultimately,
however, many lawmakers apparently felt that sex discrimination was neither as serious nor pernicious as race discrimination, and adopted the amendment limiting Title IX's application
to admissions. 35

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

ld. (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn) (emphasis added).
117 CONG. REC. 39,248 (1971).
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (emphasis added).
See 117 CONG. REC. 39,252 (1971).
The 1972 House-Senate Conference Committee substituted a provision from
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IV. MODIFICATION OF STANDARDS
A. The Definition of Title IX Coverage

The transition from Title IX's sparse language to a set of
comprehensive regulations dealing with a variety of educational
programs and activities involved a great deal of interpretation,
a task which Congress expressly delegated to the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (DREW). The agency's draft
regulations 36 reveal that in the absence of more explicit statutory direction and a shortage of case law dealing with sex discrimination in education, DREW chose to give the statute a
very broad interpretation, substantially expanding its coverage
and the agency's own powers of enforcement.
In a move that astonished many observers, for example,
DREW abrogated perhaps the most significant of Title IX's
limitations extending coverage from programs "receiving federal financial assistance" to those which, by institutional proximity, were presumed to benefit indirectly from that assistance,
and by defining "assistance" to include funds paid indirectly to
institutions by student recipients of federal financial aid. 37 In
this manner, the agency extended coverage to virtually every
aspect of both public and private institutions, transforming
Title IX jurisdiction from a narrow "program-specific" standard
into a much broader "institutional" standard of coverage. 38

the Senate version of Title IX which, instead of exempting all admissions policies
from coverage, exempted only private, undergraduate programs. See ANDREW FISHEL
& JANICE POTTKER, NATIONAL POLITICS AND SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION (1977).
36. Proposed Title IX Regulations, 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228-40 (1974).
37. See id. at 22,236.
38. Another important aspect of this interpretive exercise which helped furnish
DREW's "institutional" vision of Title IX coverage was the assertion that federal
assistance directed to a specific program could be terminated if it was used to support
a discriminatory program within the same institution. See 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228 (1974).
This assertion of remedial authority would enable the agency to more effectively
enforce the regulations by penalizing programs in direct receipt of federal assistance
for discrimination occurring in programs theoretically benefitting from that assistance.
Critics of this expansion of the agency's powers, however, asserted that it contravened
the express intent of the statute's enforcement provision which provides:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected
by ... the termination of or refusal to grant or continue assistance under such program
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Notably, this modification of standards was not only
grounded on the slimmest legal authority but involved a studious disregard of contradictory evidence and authority. 39 In support of its "benefit theory" of coverage, for example, DHEW
relied exclusively on Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 40 a
case arising under Title VI in which the Fifth Circuit remarked
or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the
record ... but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political
entity or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been mnde,
and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which
such noncompliance has been so found . .
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1972) (emphasis added).

39. Apart from inconsistency with the express language of Title IX there are at
least three additional contradictions of which DHEW was aware. First, prior to
enactment Congress specifically rejected language advancing institutional coverage,
choosing to more closely tailor the statute to the limits of its own power to condition
appropriations. 117 CONG. REC. 30,155-58 (1971). Second, the "maintenance of effort"
requirements routinely attached to federal categorical aid (which ensure that federal
funds supplement rather than supplant state or local funds) essentially make it illegal
for institutions to use those funds to support other programs. See Comment, HEW's
Regulation Under Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires
Challenges 1976 BYU L. REV. 133-87 (1976); Janet Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and
Athletics are Outside HEWs Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.J. 49, 71 (1976). And third,
within the same ruling on which DHEW placed its sole reliance, Board of Public
Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969), the court went on to state that
the agency could not affect compliance by threatening a termination of funds without
demonstrating that the program in direct receipt of funds was itself discriminatory.
Equally compromising detail surrounded DHEW's decision to include federal
student financial aid within the definition of "assistance," including the statement
made prior to enactment by Title IX's Senate sponsor Birch Bayh that "[i]t is
unquestionable in my judgement, that this would not be directed at specific assistance
that was being received by individual students." 117 CONG. REC. 30,408 (1971). In the
sole Title VI case authority cited by the agency in support of including student aid
within the definition of assistance, Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 369 F. Supp. 597
(1974) aff'd mem., No. 72-2164 (4th Cir. 1975), by contrast, the court made the specific
determination that neither Title VI's language nor its legislative history revealed a
congressional intent to exempt veterans' education benefits from coverage. Id. at 604.
Further undermining the agency's position on these issues was uncertainty over
the automatic application of precedents established under Title VI with regard to race
discrimination, to sex discrimination under Title IX. See HEW's Regulation Under
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges. 1976 BYU
L. REV. 133, 167-69. Although numerous references were made concerning the parallel
nature of the two statutes prior to enactment, constitutional law differentiates
treatment of race and sex classifications. See e.g. 117 CONG. REC. 39,098-99 (1971).
A court, according to this analysis, would be justified in giving broader meaning to
"federal assistance" under Title VI in order to "interdict constitutionally impermissible
racial discrimination" than it would under Title IX where many sex-based
classifications are constitutionally permissible. 1976 BYU L. REV., 133, 167. The
unqualified adoption of Title VI precedent, in other words, would have an
unwarranted, expansive effect on Title IX doctrine.
40. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
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in dicta that virtually all programs within an institution benefit
from federal assistance insofar as the introduction of federal
monies "releases" institutional funds for other uses. Somehow
eluding the agency's gaze, however, was the court's further
statement that DHEW could not seek to affect compliance by
terminating funds without first demonstrating that the program in direct receipt of those funds was itself discriminatoryY
Absent the power to enforce compliance in "benefitting" programs, any extension of coverage to those programs would necessarily be meaningless.
Because it was premised on such fragile authority, when
finally exposed to searching legal scrutiny, DREW's "benefit
theory" was eventually annulled by the Supreme Court in North
Haven Board of Education v. Bell 42 and Grove City College v.
Bell, 43 which returned Title IX coverage to the program-specific
standard suggested in the statute. However, because the
agency had exported its institutional standard of coverage to
several other programs in the intervening decade, the Court's
invalidation of that standard had broad implications. For this
reason, activists from an array of civil rights organizations
banded to persuade Congress to overrule Grove City with the
adoption of the Civil Rights Restoration Act (CRRA). In each of
the programs effected by Grove City, the CRRA amended the
definition of "program or activity" to include institutions. 44

B. Title IX Regulation of Athletics
1. Administrative Action

With the exception of the four-year period following Grove
City (prior to enactment of the CRRA), "institutional" definitions of Title IX coverage have had profound consequences for
athletic programs, which according to critics, are neither direct
recipients of federal assistance nor "educational" within the

41. See id. at 1074.
42. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
43. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
44. The Civil Rights Restoration Act broadened Title IX jurisdiction by
redefining the term "program" to include: "all of the operations of . . . a college,
university or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education."
Pub. L. No. 100-259 (1988) codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988).
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meaning of Title IX. 45 Guided by an institutional theory of coverage, however, DREW naturally regarded extracurricular
programs including athletics as falling within Title IX coverage
and promulgated specific regulations to govern them. 46
That action provoked a vigorous response in Congress.
Amendments to Title IX.47 were introduced to exempt athletic
programs either in whole or in part, for fear that a mandatory
expansion of women's programs would divert resources from
more visible and lucrative men's programs. 48 The sole approved
measure, the Javits Amendment, 49 directed DREW to make
"reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular
sports," a compromise attempt to exempt "revenue-producing"
sports programs which unwittingly reinforced DREW's basis
for extending coverage to athletic programs in the first place.
Congress, DREW Secretary Caspar Weinberger reasoned,
would not have imposed a "reasonableness" standard unless it
considered athletic programs to be covered by the statute. 5°
Intercollegiate athletic programs, however, differ from other
educational programs in ways that make them difficult targets
of gender-based reform, including dangerous bodily contact in
certain sports and an expectation of economic self-sufficiency at
the departmental level. 51 For this reason perhaps, DREW's
proposed regulations sought to ensure equality of opportunity
by simply equalizing participation; requiring institutions to
undertake "affirmative efforts" in the form of additional training, support, and publicity to enable women to participate in
greater numbers, and then to provide "athletic opportunities in

45. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1998).
46. See Proposed Title IX Regulations, 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228-40 (1974).
47. See 120 CONG. REC. 88488-89 (1974); 8. Con. Res. 52, 94th Cong., 121 CONG.
REC., 812695 (1975) (statement by Sen. Laxaltl; H.R. Con. Res. 311, 94'h Cong., 121
CONG. REC. H5636 (1975) (statement by Rep. Martin).
48. See 121 CONG. REC. 22,778 (1975).
49. The Javits amendment referred to in Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844 (1974) is
now codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1998).
50. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1998).
51. The use of separate men's and women's teams (an otherwise impermissible
gender classification under Title IX) to ensure that women are not "effectively"
excluded from participation by differences in size, experience and ability, for example,
involves the duplication of a host of fixed costs such as coaching salaries, facilities
and maintenance, in addition to increases in such regular operating expenses as
travel and accommodation. See Mark H. Rettig, Note, Sex Discrimination and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 IOWA L. REV. 420, 452-54 (1975).
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such sports and through such teams as will most effectively
equalize opportunities for members of both sexes." 52
While ease of administration certainly recommends that
approach, requiring institutions to develop female interest in
athletic participation also subtly shifts accountability from
those factors within the control of institutions (i.e., number and
quality of programs) to social factors largely beyond their control. From the 9700 comments, suggestions, and objections 53
elicited by these proposed requirements, accordingly, a decisive
criticism emerged: by requiring institutions to increase female
participation prior to any finding of discrimination by the institution, the requirements confused the concept of "equal opportunity" with that of "affirmative action."
Ultimately those criticisms and the clarity of the statute's
injunction against the use of preferences to correct statistical
imbalances 54 forced DREW to not only withdraw the requirements, but to admit that they were inconsistent with the mandate.55 The agency's final regulations consequently, seek to
assess equal opportunity in athletic programming by reference
to the accommodation of existing student interest, whether or
not the results are statistically equivalent. 56
Of equal or greater importance, however, is the fact that
under these final requirements the accommodation of student
interest is relegated to the status of one of a host of factors
referenced by the agency. In assessing compliance, the regulations state that DREW will consider:
(a) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of the
members of both sexes; (b) the provision of equipment and
supplies; (c) scheduling of games and practice times; (d) travel
and per diem expenses; (e) opportunity to receive coaching and
academic tutoring; (f) assignment and compensation of
coaches and tutors; (g) provision of locker rooms, practice and
competitive facilities; (h) provision of medical and training

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Proposed Title IX Regulations, 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228-40 (1974).
See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1998).
See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975).
See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,127 (1975).
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facilities and services; (i) provision of housing and dining facilities and services; and (j) publicity. 5 7

An important consequence of assessing compliance by means
other than exclusive reference to the accommodation of student
interest is that institutions are able to retain greater control of
programming decisions. 58
Several years after Congress' reluctant approval of the final
regulations, 59 the Department of Education's Office for Civil
Right ("OCR") issued the Policy Interpretation of Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics ("Policy Interpretation"), an interpretation of Title XI which the same Congress would almost certainly have disapproved because it renewed the idea of equalizing participation. 60
In the document, OCR propels "effective accommodation of
student interests and abilities" from a place of relative obscurity to the status of one of three major compliance areas. The
relevance ofthis change is readily apparent: effective accommodation is elevated from at least a one-in-ten consideration under the regulations to a one-in-three consideration. Further,
because the agency failed to clarify whether the tests must be
applied together for the purposes of establishing compliance or
may be applied independently, effective accommodation can be
understood as a "complete compliance section on its own." 61
The two other compliance areas sharing this status are equita-

57. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975).
58. It is important to note in this regard that the regulations explicitly reject
equal aggregate expenditures on men's and women's teams as the test of compliance
and instead simply obligate institutions to provide the funds "necessary" to ensure
that the opportunities provided are of similar quality. 40 Fed. Reg. 21,143 § 86.41(c)
(1975).
59. Congress' "approval" actually took the form of the legislature's inability to
pass a joint resolution disapproving of the regulations. The resolution was put
forward by lawmakers who deemed DREW's interpretation of Title IX, particularly
its interpretation of coverage, to be so aggressive as to be "ultra vires," or beyond the
rulemaking authority of the agency. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1998); see also Janet
Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics are Outside HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 GEO.
L.J. 49, 71 (1976).
60. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979). OCR assumed responsibility for Title IX
following the dissolution of DREW.
61. Susan M. Shook, The Title IX Tug-of-War and Intercollegiate Athletics in the
1990s: Nonrevenue Men's Team Join Women Athletes in the Scramble for Survival, 71
IND. L.J. 773, 797 (1996).
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ble distribution of athletic scholarships 62 and "equivalence in
other athletic benefits and opportunities" (e.g., travel and
equipment). 63
The Policy Interpretation allows institutions to demonstrate effective accommodation in three ways: (a) by showing
that the rate of participation in athletic programs by members
of the "under-represented sex" is substantially proportional to
their rate of undergraduate enrollment, (b) by producing evidence of a history and "continuing practice" of program development for members of the under-represented sex, (c) or by producing evidence that the existing program "fully and effectively"
accommodates the interests and abilities of both sexes. 64 In
most instances, the Policy Interpretation indicates, meeting the
effective accommodation requirement "will entail development
of athletic programs that substantially expand opportunities for
women to participate and compete at alllevels"-a result justified by "the discriminatory effects of the historic emphasis on
men's intercollegiate sports" and the "nationally increasing
levels ofwomen's interests and abilities." 65

62. Under a separate provision, the regulations seek to assure that scholarship
funds are awarded in proportion to the numbers of men and women participating in
athletics programs: "To the extent that a recipient awards athletic scholarships or
grants-in-aid, it must provide reasonable opportunities for such awards for members
of each sex in proportion to the number of students of each sex participating in
intercollegiate sports." 34 C.F.R. § 1906.37(c).
63. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-17 (1979).
64. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-17 (1979).
65. See 44 Fed. Reg. 74,414-19 (1979). Another important aspect of this
mechanism is the treatment of student interest assessments that the regulations left
for institutions to "consider by a reasonable means [they] deem appropriate." 40 Fed.
Reg. 24,135 (1975). In a statement reminiscent of the "affirmative effort" requirements
under the proposed regulations, the Policy Interpretation provides:
Institutions may determine the athletic interests and abilities of students by
nondiscriminatory methods of their choosing provided: [they] take into account the
nationally increasing levels of women's interests and abilities ... do not disadvantage
the members of an underrepresented sex . . . take into account team performance . . .
fand] are responsive to the expressed interests of students capable of intercollegiate
competition who are members of an underrepresented sex.
44 Fed. Reg. 71,417 (1979).
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2. Judicial Construction of Title IX

a. Private Enforcement. Another major development coming
only four years after approval of the regulations involved a
ruling of the Supreme Court which made institutions much
more vulnerable to challenge. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 66 the Court enabled individuals with complaints arising
under Title IX to circumvent time-consuming administrative
procedures by implying a private right of action. This move
precipitated a flood of new litigation and essentially installed
the courts as the primary enforcers of Title IX.
Utilizing a four-part analysis developed four years earlier in
Cort v. Ash, 67 the Supreme Court determined that the purposes
of Title IX, the legal context in which it was enacted, and the
inadequacy of the statute's funding-termination remedy for
redressing individual harm all suggested that Congress, despite
of its silence on the issue, had contemplated enforcement of
Title IX by private litigants. Justice Stevens, who authored the
majority opinion, was particularly attentive to the fact that "in
1972 when Title IX was enacted, the critical language in Title
VI had already been construed as creating a private remedy." 68
"It is always appropriate," he reasoned in imputing an awareness of those developments to the Congress, "to assume that
our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law." 69
Equally persuasive in the Court's view was the onerous
burden of proof imposed on individuals to trigger the statutory
remedy. "[I]t makes little sense to impose on an individual,
whose only interest is in obtaining a benefit for herself ... the
burden of demonstrating that an institution's practices are so
pervasively discriminatory that a complete cutoff of federal

66. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
67. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
68. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 697-98. Specifically, Justice
Stevens cited Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967),
adding that the case had been "repeatedly cited with approval and never questioned
during the ensuing five years." Id. at 698. Equally persuasive in Steven's view, was
the fact that Title IX was "enacted against a backdrop of three recently issued
implied-cause-of-action decisions of this Court involving civil rights statutes with
language similar to that in Title IX." Id. at 698 n.22 (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); and
Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)).
69. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698.
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funding is appropriate." 70 In such situations, the Court asserted, violations would be more efficiently remedied by a court
ordered injunction, "requiring an institution to accept an applicant who had been improperly excluded." 71
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell chastened the majority for succumbing to the "temptation to lend its assistance to
the furtherance of [a] remedial end deemed attractive.'m Justice Powell was particularly critical of the practice of implying
private rights of action, something he viewed as a disturbing
violation of the constitutional separation of powers because it
allows the courts to essentially expand their own jurisdiction.
"When Congress chooses not to provide a private civil remedy,"
he asserted, "federal courts should not assume the legislative
role of creating such a remedy and thereby enlarge their jurisdiction.'173 In this instance, he continued, Title IX's legislative
history is clear that "Congress deemed the administrative enforcement mechanism it did create fully adequate to protect
Title IX rights." 74
Importantly, the installation of the federal courts as the
arbiters of Title IX has tremendously accelerated the rate of
policy development under the statute. A leading example is the

70. !d. at 705.
71. ld.
72. ld. at 749.
73. Id. at 731-32. Only a single aspect of the Court's four-part analysis, Powell
observed, dealt with legislative intent, which he viewed as the only legitimate basis
for implying a right of action, while the other three he characterized as invitations
to judicial lawmaking. Powell's treatment of the three remaining Cort factors was
couched less in the facts of Cannon than in his objections to the entire practice of
implying rights of action. On this basis, his dissent in Cannon has been recognized
as the "doctrinal foundation for the Court's [subsequent] retreat from the liberal
implication doctrine" and as the "judicial birth of the New Erie doctrine" (i.e., the
judicial policy of non-interference with the decisions committed by the Constitution
to the other branches of government). Donald L. Doernberg, Juridical Chameleons in
the 'New Erie' Canal, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 759, 766; see also Mark D. Loftis, Implied
Rights of Action under Federal Statutes: The Continuing Influence of Justice Powell's
Cannon Dissent, 5 J.L. & POL'V 349, 350 (1989).
Powell took particular exception to that aspect of the Cart analysis calling for a
judicial determination of the consistency of a private right of action with the
"underlying purposes" of the legislative scheme because it "permits a court to decide
for itself what the goals of a scheme should be, and how those goals should be
advanced." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 741. Even if such invasions of the legislative
prerogative could be construed as constitutional, he asserted, they should nevertheless
be avoided because they encourage Congress to "shirk its constitutional obligation and
leave the issue to the courts to decide." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 743.
74. ld. at 730.
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Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County, 75 which validated the use of compensatory damages to remedy individual
harm arising from intentional violations ofTitle IX. 76
Similarly, judicial cognizance of Title IX athletic regulations
has rapidly evolved those requirements. The four cases regarded by proponents as the "jewels" 77 of Title IX athletic case
law, for example, (Cook v. Colgate University, 78 Cohen v. Brown
University, 79 Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 80 and
Roberts v. Colorado State University 81 ) can all be traced directly
to the Supreme Court's liberalization of Title IX enforcement .82
Interestingly, in all but one of those cases (Cook), the courts
accorded considerable deference to OCR's Policy Interpretation
and its unpublished Investigator's Manual (1990). These documents, however, clearly raised as many questions as they have
answered. Does, for example, OCR's renewed emphasis on
equalizing participation as opposed to simply prohibiting discrimination comport with the statute's goals? More specifically,

75. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
76. Following Cannon, courts struggled to resolve the Title IX grievances with
which they were dealing in increasing numbers. After a period of uncertainty and
reliance on injunctive remedies-which often led to the dismissal of lawsuits brought
by students who had graduated by the time appeals were taken-that question was
answered by the Supreme Court in Franklin (1992). Building on the private cause of
action inferred in Cannon (and imputing a generally agreeable intent to Congress
based on its actions following that decision), Franklin affirmed the power of the
Federal courts to fashion any appropriate remedy, including monetary damages, to
vindicate Title IX violations.
77. These cases initiated the judicial trend of accommodating demands that
institutions add new women's teams of reinstate discontinued teams in order to
increase the proportion of female athletes. See William E. Thro & Brian A. Snow,
Cohen v. Brown Univ. and the Future of Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Athletics,
84 Eouc. L. REP. 611 (1993).
78. 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that the university's decision to eliminate its women's softball team violated
Title IX and ordering the program reinstated).
79. The litigation generated four independent rulings: Cohen v. Brown Univ.
(Cohen IJ, 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd (Cohen In 991 F.2d 888 (1'' Cir.
1993), aff'd on remand, (Cohen IIn 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd (Cohen IV)
101 F.3d 155 (1'' Cir. 1996) and cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 1469 (1997).
80. 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
81. 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 998 F.2d
824 (lOth Cir., 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1983).
82. See Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in
Intercollegiate Athletics During 1992-93: Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard,
1994 DET. C.L. REV. 953, 963. The number of decisions issued in six cases commenced
in 1992, for example, exceeded the number of decision involving athletics rendered
during the first 19 years of Title IX's existence.
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does a test in which compliance is assessed by reference to statistical proportionality or demonstrated progress towards that
goal conform with Title IX's ban on preferential treatment or
equal protection guarantees? 83 In each case, deferring to OCR's
interpretive authority, the courts have answered those questions in the affirmative and clarified other issues of practical
importance, including whether the effective accommodation
analysis can be severed from the other major compliance areas
(i.e.; distribution of scholarships and other material benefits of
participation) for the purposes of determining compliance. 84
b. Cohen v. Brown University: Construing ''Effective Accommodation. " Of the cases construing OCR's "effective accommodation" analysis, the most illustrative, 85 exhaustive, 86 and
dispositive was Cohen v. Brown University, 87 the class-action
suit brought by female members of Brown University's volleyball and gymnastics teams after those teams, along with two
men's teams, were demoted for budgetary reasons from varsity
to club status in May of 1991.
In the course of upholding OCR's effective accommodation
analysis, the Cohen courts developed Title IX athletic policy by
clarifying the three elements of the analysis, by deciding that
"effective accommodation" itself is severable from the two other
major areas of compliance for the purposes of establishing a
violation of Title IX, and by unraveling an important challenge
to the analysis. One striking aspect of these accomplishments

83. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1998).
84. See Heckman, supra note 82. Other issues clarified included how men's and
women's programs should be compared and burdens of proof for each component of
the three-pronged effective accommodation test.
85. Cohen is most illustrative of the limits of the analysis because Brown
University had made significant strides following the enactment of Title IX to
increase and improve its athletic program for women and, at the time, had an equal
number of men's and women's teams, and female athletic participation in excess of
38% - considerably greater than that of most other institutions. See Thomas S.
Evans, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Primer on Current Legal Issues, 5 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 55-64 (1996).
86. Cohen, to reiterate, involved two trials at the district court level, one on a
preliminary injunction and another "on the merits," two appeals, and a petition for
review by the Supreme Court.
87. The litigation generated four independent rulings: Cohen v. Brown Univ.
(Cohen 1), 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd (Cohen II) 991 F.2d 888 (1" Cir.
1993), aff'd on remand, (Cohen liD 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), a{f'd (Cohen M
101 F.3d 155 (1' 1 Cir. 1996) and cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 1469 (1997).
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was the level of deference accorded to OCR's interpretation of
the statute and regulations. In rejecting Brown's contention
that the Policy Interpretation "goes so far afield that it countervails the enabling legislation," the appellate court found the
OCR document to be a "plausible" interpretation of the regulation.88 The trial court noted moreover, that when the Civil
Rights Restoration Act (1987) was enacted, Congress had the
opportunity to disapprove of the Policy Interpretation and
"chose instead to reaffirm its intent that Title IX's prohibition
against sex discrimination be broadly construed. "89
The question of severability, or whether a failing in any one
of the Policy Interpretation's three major areas of compliance
may constitute a Title IX violation, as the district court noted,
was a decisive consideration because the claim against Brown
University was based solely on an alleged violation of the effective accommodation component. 90 To avoid such a ruling, the
University argued that the Policy Interpretation and the Investigator's Manual contain a "complex framework for assessing
athletic programs as a whole" and that many more questions
and factors would have to be addressed before establishing a
Title IX violation. 91

88. The court stated in pertinent part:
Whether Brown's concept [of the effective acconunodation analysis] might be thought more
attractive, or whether we, if writing on a pristine page, would craft the regulation in a
manner different than the agency, are not very important considerations. Because the
agency's rendition stands upon a plausible, if not inevitable, reading of Title IX, we are
obligated to enforce the regulation according to its tenor.

Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen[[), 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1993). The court drew its authority
for this ruling from Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
a case in which the Supreme Court stated that a "court need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold [it)." I d. at 843.
Elsewhere the court noted: "Although [OCR] is not a party to this appeal, we must accord
its interpretation of Title IX appreciable deference. The degree of deference is particularly
high in the Title IX cases because Congress explicitly delegated to the agency the task of
prescribing standards for athletic programs under Title IX." ld. at 895. Ironically, the
court traced the source of OCR's "explicit delegation" to none other than the 1974 Javits
Amendment to Title IX which was enacted to secure special treatment in the regulations
for revenue-producing sports in the event that athletics might be covered by the pending
regulations. See supra, note 49.
89. 879 F. Supp. 185, 198 (D.R.I. 1995).
90. See Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen l), 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992).
91. ld. at 987. The Investigator's Manual states: "[t]here is no rule or number
of disparities that when reached constitutes a violation. Generally, the determination
is whether, in reviewing the program as a whole the disparities add up to a denial
of equal opportunity to athletes of one sex."

51]

TITLE IX

73

The court of appeals found both documents inconclusive and
pointed to conflicting language in the Investigator's Manual,
providing that investigations may be limited to less than all
three of the major compliance areas. The court ruled that because participation controls access to all other benefits provided
by athletic programs, the effective accommodation analysis
could be severed from an overall determination of compliance.
Equal opportunity to participate lies at the core of Title IX's
purpose. Because the [effective accommodation analysis] delineates this heartland, we agree that the district courts that
have so ruled and hold that, with regard to the effective accommodation of students' interests and abilities, an institution can violate Title IX even if it meets the "financial assistance" and "athletic equivalence" standards. In other words,
an institution that offers women a smaller number of athletic
opportunities than the statute requires may not rectify that
violation simply by lavishing more resources on those women
or achieving equivalence in other respects. 92
Having concluded that effective accommodation was "the
point of departure for evaluating compliance," the courts went
on to apply the Policy Interpretation's three-pronged analysis to
the facts presented, 93 summarily noting that a thirteen point
disparity between the percentage of women athletes and the
percentage of women undergraduates at Brown failed to satisfy
the first test of "substantial proportionality. "94 As a matter of
law, the appellate court noted (Cohen II), "proportionality" furnishes a 'safe harbor' from Title IX liability, and institutions
not wishing to engage in extensive compliance analysis "may
stay on the sunny side of Title IX simply by maintaining gender
parity between its student body and its athletic lineup." 95
The second and third prongs of the effective accommodation
analysis, "[a] history and practice of continuing program expan-

92. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 897.
93. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-17 (1979).
94. Cohen I, 809 F. Supp. at 991. The district court noted after remand that
because satisfaction of the substantial proportionality test effectively terminates the
entire analysis, as a practical matter, the standard must be stringent enough to
effectuate the purposes of Title IX: "[t]hus, substantial proportionality is properly
found only where the institution's intercollegiate athletic program mirrors the student
enrollment as closely as possible." Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen Ill), 879 F. Supp.
185, 202 (D.R.I. 1995).
95. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 897-98.
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sian" and "full and effective accommodation," according to the
Cohen II appellate court, reflect "that there are circumstances
under which, as a practical matter, something short of ... proportionality is a satisfactory proxy for gender balance." 96 In
applying the second prong, however, the district court found
that although Brown University had significantly increased
opportunities for female athletes in the 1970's immediately
after Title IX was enacted, a ten-year hiatus failed to demonstrate a continuing practice of program expansion. 97
The third prong, the appellate court remarked in its first
review of the case, "sets a high standard." 98 "[I]t demands not
merely some accommodation, but 'full and effective accommodation.' If there is sufficient interest and ability among members
of the statistically underrepresented gender, not slaked by existing programs, an institution necessarily fails this prong of
the test." 99 In applying this final prong on remand (Cohen Ill),
the district court found that the University's demotion of two
women's teams in which "there is great interest and talent" was
indicative of something less than full and effective accommodation. Subsequently, the court concluded that Brown was in violation of Title IX, and ordered the University to submit a comprehensive plan for achieving compliance. 100
Brown appealed the Court's conclusion on both legal and
empirical grounds. 101 The most important of its legal arguments
involved the charge that the third prong of the analysis requires an institution to accommodate every expression of student interest "to the fullest extent until the substantial propor-

96. Id. at 898.
97. See Cohen I, 809 F. Supp. at 991.
98. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 898.
99. Id.
100. See Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 211-12.
101. In seeking review by the Supreme Court, for example, the University
contested its condemnation under the third-prong of "full and effective
accommodation" by producing evidence tending to show that Brown women were less
interested in athletic participation than men. Over a four-year period, specifically
Brown's survey of its applicants for admission revealed that women were far less
interested in participating in competitive sports than men. The University also
produced evidence that women's participation in college varsity sports nationally
exceeds their participation in other college sports programs, such as club and
intramural sports, and fell far short of the levels of participation by men in those
activities. Appellant's Petition for Certiorari, 1996. This is the crux of the ongoing
debate-whether colleges and universities should be accountable for culturally inspired
differences in interest.
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tionality of prong one is achieved," thus imposing "preferential
or disparate treatment to members of one sex on account of [a
statistical] imbalance" in contravention of both Title IX
(§1681[b]) and the Equal Protection Clause. 102
The courts' response to this argument was most fully developed in the University's second appeal in 1996 (Cohen IV).
There the First Circuit court stated emphatically that this "is
not an affirmative action case. "103 With regard to the specific
charge that the effective accommodation analysis mandates the
use of gender-based preferences and quotas, the court ruled
that because the analysis provides two ways to demonstrate
compliance that are unrelated to proportionality, the analysis
violates neither Title IX's own prohibition on preferential treatment nor equal protection guarantees. "The question of substantial proportionality under the Policy Interpretation's threepart test," the court asserted, "is merely the starting point for
analysis, rather than the conclusion; a rebuttable presumption
rather than an inflexible requirement." 104
On this occasion, however, the University was not alone in
its belief that the different elements of the effective accommodation analysis should be taken together, rather than viewed in
isolation for the purposes of analysis under Title IX's ban on the
use of preferences (§ 1681[b]) or equal protection doctrine, because a determination of noncompliance necessarily involves all
three tests. In his dissenting opinion, for example, the chief
judge of the First Circuit stated, "[i]n my view it is the result of
the test, and not the number of steps involved, that should determine if a quota system exists." 105 While agreeing that "no
aspect of the Title IX regime at issue ... mandates genderbased preferences or quotas," Judge Torruella nevertheless
argued that taken together the three prongs comprise "an affirmative action, quota-based scheme." 106
The majority claims that 'neither the Policy Interpretation nor
the district court's interpretation of it mandates statistical
balancing.' The logic of this position escapes me .... The first
prong ... surely requires statistical balancing .... The second
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen IVJ, 101 F.3d 155, 174-75 (1'' Cir. 1996).
Id. at 169.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 196.
Id.
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prong ... is essentially a test that requires the school to show
that it is moving in the direction of satisfYing the first prong.
Establishing that a school is moving inexorably closer to satisfying a requirement that demands statistical balancing can
only be done by demonstrating an improvement in the statistical balance .... Finally, the third prong ... goes farther than
the straightforward quota test of prong one . . . the unmet
interests of the underrepresented sex must be completely
accommodated before any of the interest of the
overrepresented gender can be accommodated. 107
Notably, in Pederson u. Louisiana State Uniuersity 108 a Louisiana district court gave effect to Judge Torruella's remarks
when, on the belief that the interpretation of the effective accommodation analysis in Cohen and Roberts advanced the use
of prohibited preferences and quotas, the court refused to follow
those decisions. In their acceptance of proportionality as an
appropriate test of Title IX compliance, the court reasoned:
[those cases] strongly rely on each other and on a stated administrative deference .... However, the jurisprudential emphasis on numerical "proportionality" is not found within the
statute or the regulations; rather, it is inferred from language
in the Policy Interpretation and ignores other language within
the Policy Interpretation and the statute which argues against
such an inference. 109
Finding that statistical tests of compliance run counter to
the statutory objective acknowledged by the Supreme Court (in
both Cannon and Franklin) of protecting individuals, rather
than groups, from gender-based discrimination, and that preferential treatment based on such tests is explicitly prohibited,
the Pederson court concluded that the deference accorded by the
courts Cohen and Roberts to OCR's Policy Interpretation was
misplaced. 110

Id.
912 F. Supp 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
Id. at 914.
See id. at 913. The Court further stated:
To accept the interpretation in Roberts, Cohen and Homer, and the argument made by

107.
108.
109.
110.

defendants [LSU], one must assume that interest and ability to participate in sports is
equal as between all men and women on all campuses. For instance, if a university has
50% female students and 50% male students, the assumption, under this argument must
follow that the same percentage of its male population as its female population has the
ability to participate and the interest or desire to participate in sports at the same
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V. DISCUSSION

As Brown University discovered, Title IX athletic regulation
now, more than ever, is an animal with teeth. Without any
other prerequisite, an aggrieved student-athlete may initiate
and maintain a lawsuit on the basis of an institutions' failure to
achieve or maintain statistical proportionality; compensatory
damages may be awarded to redress individual harm,; and
court orders may be issued to expand offerings for women athletes, coercing a redistribution of resources within athletic departments.
Whatever view one takes of this regulatory machinery and
its relationship to Title IX, there is no evidence of an organized
effort to deliver colleges and universities into the hands of federal bureaucrats, no furtive plot to deprive them of their autonomy or academic freedom. Having said that, the parallels between the existing requirements and the broader but non-explicit purposes of Title IX do lend themselves to a depiction of
the agencies and courts struggling to cast- off the statute's express and implied limitations to achieve a different vision of
gender-equality, particularly in the area of intercollegiate athletics. The emphasis on statistical proportionality, in particular,
can be viewed as a reflection of the belief, widely held among
social reformers, that interest and ability follow opportunity.
Based on the foregoing analysis it may be argued that the
development Title IX policy generally, and Title IX athletic
policy specifically, has paralleled two distinct disagreements or
policy conflicts first encountered in the course of the statutue's
formation. These policy conflicts can be loosely defined as "total
versus qualified equality" and "equality versus autonomy."

competitive level. A review of Roberts, Cohen and Horner finds no evidence to prove
or disprove this assumption ....
Without some basis for such a pivotal assumption, this Court is loathe to join others
in creating the "safe harbor" or dispositive assumption for which defendants and
plaintiffs argue. Rather, it seems much more logical that interest in participation and
levels of ability to participate as percentages of the male and female populations will
vary from campus to campus and region to region and will change with time. To
assume, and thereby mandate, an unsupported and static determination of interest and
ability as the cornerstone of the analysis can lead to unjust results.
Id at 913-14.
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A. Total Equality us Qualified Equality

The struggle over the level of protection to be accorded sex
discrimination was first evident in the attempt by women's
groups to replicate federal policy regarding race discrimination
through constitutional litigation, advancement of the ERA and
in the initial stages of the legislative effort which led to the
creation of Title IX itself. In each of those endeavors, proponents advanced a "no exceptions" policy premised on the belief
that sex, like race, is an immutable characteristic and therefore, an inequitable basis for differential treatment.
But while Congress gave its reluctant approval to the ERA
whose ratification by a majority of the states seemed distant
and unlikely, it rejected the much more immediate prospect of
regulating sex discrimination through a simple extension of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (1964). In so doing legislators
Congress tacitly rejected the use of race policy as a benchmark
for Title IX protection, choosing instead to honor the distinctions between race and sex discrimination in constitutional law,
and diverting Title IX from the path of "total equality" onto a
path of "qualified equality."
The second instance of this conflict involved the struggle,
prior to enactment, over the exemption of undergraduate admissions policies from Title IX coverage which proponents understood to be the lynchpin of Title IX protection inasmuch as
the number of men and women admitted to college would have
a direct bearing on the level of accommodation necessitated
elsewhere. Based on the rejection of the amendment to Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act, however, arguments advanced by higher
education leaders and their congressional allies bore the assumption that Title IX was a "qualified" statement of nondiscrimination policy, contemplated to accommodate the autonomy
and academic judgement of colleges and universities. Legislators validated that assumption, in part, by agreeing to exempt
the admissions policies ofthe more insular and tradition-bound
private institutions.
A third instance involved the attempts between 1973 and
1975 to exempt revenue-producing sports from Title IX coverage, a move thought to be justified by the redistributive potential of the statute and regulations. While acknowledging the
qualified nature of Title IX protection by adopting an amend-
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ment which insinuates a desire for special treatment, however,
on this occasion Congress declined the invitation to further
qualify that protection on the basis of conflicting economic priorities.
The final example of conflict over the total versus qualified
nature of Title IX protection involved the question of causation
visible in the shifting standards of accountability for differences
in male and female interest in athletic participation. The earliest indication of tension in this area involved the inclusion
within Title IX of a provision(§ 1681[b]) prohibiting the use of
preferences to correct "statistical imbalances." There can be
little doubt that this provision was intended included to abate
the fear that Title IX would be used to create a new class of
"entitlements," or an obligation on the part of institutions to
redress the effects of societal forces on female participation in
higher education. 111
Notwithstanding that express limitation, the issue immediately surfaced in the first draft of DREW's athletic regulations
which proposed the imposition of "affirmative efforts" to cultivate and then accommodate female interest in participation.
Following a torrent of negative feedback and faced with the
prospect of congressional review, however, the agency recanted
and in its final regulations limited its concern to existing student interest
Clarifying the regulations five years later (1979), OCR returned to the more aggressive approach, specifying that compliance with the effective accommodation component of the regulations would be assessed by reference to the proportionality of
male and female participation in athletic programs to their
respective rates of undergraduate enrollment and, failing that
inquiry, demonstrations of either a history of program expansion or "full and effective" accommodation of female interest in
participation. 112
The difference between ensuring equal opportunity and
remedying the effects of societal discrimination under this
"three-pronged" analysis, however, is not an intuitive one. Nevertheless, in the Cohen series of cases the courts expended a
great deal of energy attempting to make that distinction in

111. See 117 CONG. REC. 5,813 (1972).
112. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-17 (1979).
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order to avoid condemnation of the effective accommodation
analysis under the statutory ban on preferences and statistical
balancing. By holding that a failure of the first prong (proportionality) alone is sufficient to establish a presumption of noncompliance, moreover, the courts have succeeded in further
shifting responsibility for societal influences on women's interest in sports to colleges and universities. 113 That result is
clearly more congruent with a doctrine of "total equality" than
with the qualified form of equality actually enacted.
B. Equality us. Autonomy

Many of the competing demands put forward during Title IX
implementation stemmed from the right perceived by institutions to self-determination. Depending upon the context, this
alleged prerogative was alternatively advanced as an essential
element of the loosely acknowledged doctrine of institutional
academic freedom, and as a logical and necessary extension of
Congress' longstanding but informal policy of not interfering in
college and university affairs.
The specification of Title IX of jurisdiction provides the earliest illustration ofthe conflict between the claims to self-determination and the statute's broader purpose of eliminating sex
discrimination in education. In that instance, lawmakers rejected a Senate version of Title IX which would have extended
coverage to institutional recipients of federal assistance, preferring to limit coverage to those individual programs and activities within institutions in direct receipt of funds. 114 To reinforce
this limitation, a provision was inserted stating that the termi-

113. The amicus brief filed by sixty colleges and universities supports this
conclusion:
Contrary to the wording of Title IX which does no more than prohibit discrimination
''on the basis of sex," the [analysis] virtually eliminates the requirement of causation,
i.e. that the reason for the disparity be sex discrimination ... the only defenses are that
a college or university has a history and continuing practice of program expansion for
female athletes or that female athletes have been fully accommodated in the athletic
program. These "defenses," however, are in effect nothing more than a recognition that
Title IX compliance will take time .... The polestar of a violation remains the fact of
a statistical disparity, regardless of cause. Under this definition of discrimination, the
issue is not whether the abilities and/or interests of male and female athletes are equally
accommodated but whether each group gets its quota of the available varsity positions
as measured by their percentage in the student body.

Brief of Sixty Colleges and Universities as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition, 1996.
114. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1998).
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nation of federal assistance shall be "limited in its effect to the
particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found." 115 This passage meant that only those
programs in direct receipt of federal assistance could be penalized for noncompliance.
The second expression of this conflict involved Congress'
exemption of the admissions policies of private institutions
from the operation of Title IX. In that debate, conservative
lawmakers asserted that the imposition of Title IX would erode
the academic freedom of colleges and universities to set their
own educational policy by dictating the "appropriate" ratio of
men and women on campus. 116 Illustrating the divergence of
opinion on this issue, Title IX proponents responded that disguising gender bias as a component academic freedom not only
failed to make it legitimate, but disparaged women and nullified the concepts of social responsibility, taxpayer equity, and
civil rights. 117
A third example involved DREW's interpretation of Title IX
jurisdiction. A broad interpretation of coverage would vastly
expand the agency's ability to combat discrimination. To accomplish that goal, DHEW sharply departed from a literal interpretation of the statute. An examination of the legal reasoning
employed to justify the expansion of coverage to "institutional"
recipients of federal assistance imparts a definite sense of an
agency attempting to "break out of the constraints" of an enacted compromise to strike a new balance between institutional
interests in self-determination and its own the desire to eradicate sex discrimination. 118
When the issue was revisited in Grove City, the Supreme
Court took a decidedly more formalistic approach, according
greater weight to the legislative choice of language and history
than to the desire for more effective regulation. With political
support for more effective regulation mounting, however, Congress ultimately intervened to realign the political balance between equality and autonomy 119 to make institutional liability a

115. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1998).
116. 117 CONG. REC. 39,249 (1971).
117. See id.
118. See Clune, supra note 13.
119. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259 codified as 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1685 (1998).
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permanent feature of Title IX and other anti-discrimination
programs.
Finally, there are the decisions in Cannon and Franklin
where the Supreme Court liberally imputed intent to Congress
to enhance Title IX enforcement by enabling individuals to
enforce the statute by means of private lawsuits. Formerly, the
statute's administrative enforcement mechanism combined
with DREW's inability to discharge its responsibilities 120 had
operated as an effective safeguard of institutional autonomy.
Following Cannon and Franklin, however, the political balance
of the Title IX program tipped in favor of equality, rather than
autonomy, as individuals with the assistance of the courts,
were installed as the became the principal enforcers of Title
IX-a result arguably at odds with the will of the legislature.

VI. CONCLUSION
Although the foregoing analysis was not meant to establish
a discreet, causal connection between the policy conflicts encountered in the formation of Title IX and form or direction of
the ensuing policy development, it does offer some general reinforcement of several of the assertions put forward in Clune's
political model of implementation.
One of those assertions is that legal objectives of a given
implementation change when "[t]he priorities represented by
the law enter a world with many other priorities." 121 In the
context of Title IX regulation of college sports, nothing could be
clearer. From a highly confined expression of nondiscrimination
policy, for example, jurisdictional standards were stretched to
include athletics which, economically speaking, are quite remote from the benefits of federal assistance. Further, rather
than seeking to simply ensure nondiscrimination at the institutional level, by encouraging institutions to equalize participa-

120. For a number of years prior to Cannon, OCR had never terminated
assistance for a Title IX violation, and would issue a letter of compliance if
institutions simply executed an "assurance" that they would come into compliance
sometime in the future (an informal policy aired in the agency's proposed Policy
Interpretation but removed from the final version). See Ellen Vargas, Franklin
v.Gwinnett County Public Schools and its Impact on Title IX Enforcement, 19 J.C. &
U.L. 373, 381 (1993).

121. William Clune & M. Van Pelt, A Political Method of Evaluation: The
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and the Several Gaps of Gap
Analysis, 48 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 39 (1985).
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tion the bureaucratic interpretation ofTitle IX upheld in Cohen
is arguably more concerned with ameliorating societal attitudes
about female participation in sports .
How these changes came about is the question of greatest
interest-and the one of greatest difficulty. An additional ambition of this Article, notwithstanding, has been to examine several of the model's higher-order assertions: 1) that implementation is a "recursive" process in which changes in legal standards
typically revolve around policy conflicts first encountered during the formation of the mandate; 2) that the legal process of
implementation makes discretion more accessible to special
interests which may actually set decision making processes in
motion; and 3) that the legal decision making occurring in implementation is infused with public policy discourse (either
explicit or implied).
As to the claim of recursiveness, the preceding discussion
illustrated that two very basic conflicts have had a durable
effect on the development of Title IX policy: total versus qualified equality and equality versus autonomy. The debate over
equalizing participation consummated in Cohen for example,
provides an illustration of the struggle over the identity of Title
IX first witnessed in the formative effort to emulate race policy-whether, that is, the program would attempt to remedy sex
discrimination and its effects or be limited to eradicating discriminatory policies and practices within schools, colleges, and
universities.
Whether the history and analysis of Title IX implementation produced have shown that special interests held sway over
legal outcomes is another matter of interpretation, but an intuitively more difficult one because much of the development
which occurred emanated from a single source: DREW and its
successor, OCR. In the majority of instances these agencies,
rather than Congress or the courts, were the facilitators of
change, as in the extension of Title IX coverage to indirect beneficiaries of federal assistance and the invention of regulations
and guidelines giving the program a more pronounced remedial
focus. 122
122. It is indicative of the agency's disposition towards the nondiscrimination
purposes of Title IX, rather than the statute's recognition of competing institutional
interests, that even when changing policy was not specifically within its control, it
actively supported the expansion of those goals; as in Cannon where the agency
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Although the agencies crowded the field, there are concrete
examples of special interests using the different elements of
government to respond to one another's actions in ways which
precipitated changes in standards. Perhaps the most volatile of
those interactions involved the definition of Title IX coverage.
DREW's sympathetic interpretation of the statute's jurisdictional limitations prompted efforts in Congress to renounce the
agency's regulations as well as the initiation of lawsuits which
ultimately implicated the Supreme Court and further action by
Congress. A different but equally responsive pattern is visible
in the later stages of implementation where OCR and the
courts engaged in a "give-give" relationship, supporting one
another's efforts to make substantial proportionality the
measure of compliance.
Finally, the "deconstruction" of several important developments conducted in this Article makes it supremely obvious
that the legal decision-making which has occurred in the course
of Title IX implementation has been infused with public policy
discourse, the third of Clune's assertions. From a legal perspective, DREW's decision-making (which was almost uniformly
more consistent with a desire for the most comprehensive and
remedial provisions than with the limitations delineated in the
mandate) can only be described as unconventional: in the sense
that its actions and explanations gravitated toward the most
aggressive and least supportive positions, and in the sense that
its sympathy for the underlying purposes of the statute was
almost candid.
Although judicial decisions are more difficult to characterize
because of the complexity of legal reasoning, it is possible to
spot activism, even when it emanates from a body as legally
accomplished as the Supreme Court. The Court's willingness to
impute knowledge and decisions to Congress in the course of
implying both a right of action and a damages remedy, for example, impart an unmistakable sense of result-oriented jurisprudence. Yet, from a public policy standpoint, those decisions
make excellent sense.

supplied the Court with its opinion that an implied right of action would neither
conflict with Title IX's statutory enforcement mechanism nor interfere with its own
efforts to effectuate the goals of the statute.
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Many of the decisions examined in this Article, in fact, were
plainly result-oriented, with legalistic detail provided more as
an assertion of how the law might be developed to support a
desired outcome than to demonstrate how the contemplated
outcome actually squared with the mandate, legislative history,
or the regulations. The reasoning employed by the different
courts in Cohen to uphold OCR's effective accommodation analysis, and to sever the analysis from the other aspects of the
regulation, is illustrative. There the courts summarily deferred
to OCR's interpretative authority and then fiercely endeavored
to distinguish the effective accommodation analysis in such a
way that it could be rescued from Title IX's ban on preferences
and statistical balancing.
A few things seem clear from a simple reading of Title IX: it
prohibits sex discrimination in those programs over which Congress has direct control (owing to the receipt of federal assistance); it is a qualified ban on sex discrimination (as it includes
important exemptions and limitations); the use of preferences
to correct statistical imbalances is forbidden; and enforcement
is to be affected by administrative agencies primarily through
the termination of funds. If these very literal translations of the
statute can be characterized as the expectations shared at the
outset of the program, this study has shown that these expectations, depending on one's perspective, have either been exceeded or ignored.
Much of the potential for the invasion of institutional prerogatives feared by institutions in the policy formation process,
correspondingly, has been realized. Currently, colleges and
universities face much greater exposure to Title IX regulation
than presaged by the compromises reached during the statute's
formation on the issues of coverage, enforcement, and remedial
obligations.
By today's standards, however, many of Title IX's limitations seem anachronistic, and for many years frustrated the
groundswell of political support for women's rights. As theresult of two decades of continuous interaction, on the other hand,
the current regulatory framework, which Cohen helped to solidify, is perhaps a more accurate reflection of societal norms regarding women's rights and the responsibility of social institutions to effect social change.

